Real Estate Advisor Law Blog : Ohio Real Estate Lawyer & Attorney : Ulmer & Berne Law Firm : Columbus, Cleveland OH

Imagine purchasing a brand new home, only to discover it has a persistent rotten egg smell. On top of that, your new appliances mysteriously stop working and the home’s copper wiring turns black. It sounds like a nightmare, but for those in Florida and other southern states whose homes contain defective Chinese drywall, it is reality.

Although it now seems a distant memory, there was a time not long ago when new homes were being constructed across the country at a record pace. This housing boom, combined with the need to repair damage from severe hurricanes in Florida, created unprecedented demand for building materials such as drywall. When domestic sources of drywall ran low around 2005, some contractors and builders, particularly in Florida, began using drywall imported from China. It has been estimated that enough Chinese drywall for 60,000 homes was imported to the U.S.   

Unfortunately for the owners of the homes containing the Chinese drywall, it emits sulfur gas that corrodes copper and gives off a rotten egg smell. Attorneys for the affected homeowners also allege that the gas causes respiratory and other health problems, though the manufacturers of the drywall contend that it does not.

Class action lawsuits have been filed against builders and drywall manufacturers in a number of southern states. So far, it does not appear that any Chinese drywall made it as far as Ohio, although one Columbus-based builder, M/I Homes, has been named as a defendant in a lawsuit concerning homes it built in Florida.

Though certain builders have stepped up and voluntarily replaced the defective Chinese drywall in some homes, others are unwilling or financially unable to do so, frustrating owners who have already seen their property values plummet due to the mortgage crises. It remains to be seen whether these owners will receive any relief as a result of the lawsuits.

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Ohio’s Ninth District Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from a foreclosure judgment in March after ruling that the disbursement of sheriff sale proceeds rendered the appeal moot. In Bankers Trust Company of California v. Tutin, 2009 Ohio 1333 (9^th Dist. Ct. App. 2009), Bankers Trust filed a complaint for foreclosure against Barry Tutin, alleging Tutin defaulted on a mortgage note on property in Peninsula, Ohio. The complaint was amended to add Tutin’s former wife, Laura Lynch, because she held a life estate in the property. The trial court ruled that Bankers Trust’s mortgage had priority over Lynch’s life estate. Lynch appealed the ruling twice, but each was dismissed because the court had not entered a final, appealable order. During these two appeals, Lynch obtained a stay of the trial court’s judgment preventing disbursement of the sale proceeds. After dismissal of the second appeal, however, the stay expired and the sheriff disbursed the proceeds to Bankers Trust. Lynch then appealed the trial court’s final order and its failure to order Bankers Trust to return the sale funds.  

The Court of Appeals followed what it described as a “well-established principle of law” and dismissed Lynch’s appeal as moot. It pointed to Ohio cases holding that satisfaction of a judgment renders an appeal from that judgment moot. Here, satisfaction of the judgment took the form of the sheriff releasing the foreclosure sale receipts. The court did not address the difference between this type of “bureaucratic” judgment satisfaction and judgment satisfaction voluntarily given by a private party. 

As the court noted, but found unpersuasive, several recent Ohio appellate decisions preserved a remedy for appellants after foreclosure sale proceeds were distributed. See e.g. LaSalle Bank v. Murray. The contrary cases focused on Ohio Revised Code 2329.45, which states: “If a [foreclosure judgment] is reversed, such reversal shall not…affect the title of the purchaser. In such case restitution must be made by the judgment creditor of the money for which such lands…were sold.” [emphasis added] The Bankers Trust court found that these decisions improperly extended 2329.45 to post-disbursement situations, and held that the statute only addresses situations where a stay has prevented disbursement of sale funds. This argument seems to belie the explicit language of 2329.45, however, which refers to restitution by a judgment creditor, who could only hold proceeds following distribution from the sheriff. 

Whether or not the Bankers Trust decision is upheld on appeal (questionable given the case law and 2329.45) should be of great interest to mortgage lenders. If the decision endures, lenders may point to a clear end-goal of disbursement, rather than concerning themselves with the outcome of subsequent appeals. 

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A tenant always prefers an SNDA so that if the landlord's lender forecloses, the lender will have to respect the tenant's lease. But if the landlord files bankruptcy, or if the lender causes the landlord to file bankruptcy, the landlord can reject the tenant's lease anyway thereby subjecting the tenant to the very risk it was seeking to avoid.

In a currently ongoing bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy trustee went so far as to demand  the tenant to move out immediately because the trustee was shutting off utilities to save money for the estate.  In most cases, the lender does not want to avoid the lease because it wants the rental income. For the same reason, the trustee usually does not want to reject the lease. 

The real risk is where the property is to be redeveloped for a completely different use or is being held by a non-operator who wants no responsibility for operations whatsoever. In both cases, an SNDA may not suffice given the remedies available in bankruptcy.  

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In U.S. Bank National Association  v. Gullotta, 120 Ohio St 3d 399, the Ohio Supreme Court decided that multiple actions under the same note and mortgage are subject to the two-dismissal rule and res judicata preclusion. The decision could have far-reaching implications for lenders seeking to workout loans with troubled borrowers.   

The history of the case is important to understanding its impact. In June 2003, Giuseppe Gullotta entered into a note and mortgage with MILA, Inc., which assigned the note to U.S. Bank. In April 2004, U.S. Bank filed a foreclosure complaint for the total principal due on the note, plus interest from November 1, 2003. It voluntarily dismissed this complaint in June 2004. In September 2004, U.S. Bank filed a second identical complaint, except with interest running from December 1, 2003, which it also voluntarily dismissed in March 2005. In October 2005, U.S. Bank filed a third foreclosure complaint on Gullotta’s note and mortgage. After Gullotta filed a motion to dismiss, U.S. Bank amended its complaint to seek interest only from April 1, 2005 (the first missed payment date after its second dismissal).

Ohio Civil Procedure Rules state that “a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits of any claim that the plaintiff has once dismissed in any court.” A second dismissal is with prejudice and res judicata preclusion takes effect. Under a res judicata analysis, any claim “arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action” is barred. 

The Court held that each missed payment under the same note and mortgage does not give rise to a new claim, and therefore U.S. Bank’s two earlier dismissals precluded a third action. It premised this holding on four critical facts: 1) the underlying note and mortgage never changed, 2) the bank accelerated the payment upon initial default and demanded the same principal payment in every complaint, 3) Gullotta never made another payment after his initial default, and 4) U.S. Bank never reinstated the loan. 

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How low will they go?

Bending to market pressures, Cuyahoga County Auditor Frank Russo recently announced that the County’s 2009 valuation update will likely result in significant decreases in the County’s assessed value of residential homes – with an 8% average reduction across the County. 

The media reports note that the State intends to compare Mr. Russo’s proposed values to the actual sales figures from each community and will ultimately approve new fair market values likely between 92% to 94% of the fair market value.  The State’s suggestion of a 6% to 8% discount off of the appraised fair market value is really aimed at those properties that have not been recently sold. This “discount” should not be applicable to those non-residential properties where there was a recent arm’s length sale of the property. 

School districts (when the sale exceeds the current assessed value) and property owners (when the sale is below the assessed value) actively seek adjustment of the market value of the non-residential properties to an amount equal to the purchase price. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the purchase price paid in an arm’s length sale is the best indication of the fair market value of real property.  

The Auditor’s decision to seek an 8% average reduction in value comes at the close of the property tax complaint filing season which ended March 31. In Cuyahoga County alone, a reported 17,000 decrease complaints were filed at the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision with respect to the 2008 tax year. Compared to the record 10,000 decrease filings last year with respect to the 2007 tax year, the 2008 “off-year” filings (the last year of the 2006-2008 triennium) are extremely notable.  

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Two foreclosure related bills of great interest to both borrowers and lenders were introduced in the Ohio House of Representatives in February but are moving slowly, if at all, through the legislative process.  One of the bills is too bold to have a serious shot at getting signed by Governor Strickland, but the other is modest enough that it may pass. 

House Bill 3, the more sweeping of the two, has languished in the Housing and Urban Revitalization Committee.  At a very basic level, the bill would: 

1.         Impose a six-month foreclosure moratorium, during which a court could not hear or issue judgment on a foreclosure complaint.  The moratorium loses a bit of its teeth, however, as a mortgagee an petition the court to proceed with the action if a borrower is more than thirty days late on a payment during the moratorium.

2.         Establish new filing requirements for residential foreclosure complaints, including certain notices to be given to borrowers by loan servicers, a statement of mortgage information (including the identity of the note holder), an appraisal, and a $1,500 filing fee.

 3.         Allow common pleas judges to modify mortgage terms, including principal amount, in residential foreclosures if the judge determines the modification would benefit both parties.

 4.         Require mortgage loan servicers to register with the state and be subject to extensive regulation and oversight.

 5.         Establish a loan modification program, run by the Director of Commerce, which would allow borrowers to modify loans when a modification would result in a greater recovery to the lender than a foreclosure. 

 The drastic nature of HB 3, particularly the mortgage modification provisions, has led to strenuous opposition and even promises of constitutional challenges (and here) should it pass.   While the bill as a whole likely won’t move much further, it wouldn’t be surprising to see small pieces of it come up for a vote.  If any significant portion of HB 3 passes, lenders will be faced with sharply increased mortgage-related operating costs.  They would need to quickly develop processes to determine which distressed properties are eligible for the moratorium bypass and whether the $1500 filing fee makes a workout preferable to foreclosure on a given property. 

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Effective June 1, 2009 all residential properties (single family homes, condominium units and buildings with up to four units) in Cook County, Illinois will become subject to the amendments to the Illinois Notary Public Act contained in Illinois Public Act 095-0988 (the "Act") in an effort to combat mortgage fraud in Illinois residential real estate transactions.  The practical effect of the Act is that Illinois notaries will have to comply with the Act for all covered Cook County conveyances.

The Act is a pilot program applicable only to Cook County real property conveyances from June 1, 2009 through July 1, 2013.  The Act will require Illinois notaries to take and save a copy of the right thumbprint of all individuals selling residential property in Cook County.  The Act provides that if a right thumbprint is not available, alternative digits can be used.  The thumbprint record must be saved by the notary for seven years and is not subject to copying or inspection under the Freedom of Information Act.  The Act proscribes a Notarial Record form for the collection and retention of the record of the thumbprint.  The Act does not exclude developers of individual condominium units in multi-unit projects from the fingerprinting requirements.  Developers who do not want their in-house notaries to be bothered with the Act's record retention requirements should plan on attending closings at a title insurance company for at least the next five years !

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